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EXAMINING THE LEGALITY OF EMPLOYEE 
MICROCHIPPING UNDER THE LENS OF THE 
TRANSHUMANISTIC PROACTIONARY PRINCIPLE 
 
JOSHUA Z. WASBIN* 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
Modern workplaces are beginning to look to implanting their 
employees with RFID microchips as a replacement for badges and 
keycards. While both employers and employees stand to benefit from the 
convenience of this innovation, states have begun to look to legislative 
options for restricting employers from requiring that their employees get 
microchipped. This Note will examine some of the state legislation and 
will argue that Congress must institute a federal law that will provide 
similar, if not stronger, levels of protection for employees who seek to 
avoid being microchipped, an argument premised upon the 
Transhumanistic Proactionary Principle.  
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Last August, fifty employees of a United States company voluntarily 
agreed to receive a microchip injected into their skin between their thumb 
and index fingers.1 Microchipping is the process of inserting an encased 
radio-frequency identification (“RFID”) transponder subdermally into an 
employee’s hand. This Note argues that, based on balancing the 
technology against the factors of the Proactionary Principle, Congress 
must institute a federal law that prevents employers from requiring that 
their employees receive a microchip implant or “microchipping,” as well 
as protections for employees who, under voluntary schemes, refuse the 
microchip given the dynamics that might imply pressure even if 
microchipping is presented as optional.  
  
                                                      
*   Executive Primary Editor, Washington University Jurisprudence Review; J.D. Candidate, 
Washington University in St. Louis Class of 2019; B.S. in English, Creative Writing - Poetry, 
University of California, Los Angeles Class of 2011. 
 1. Rachel Metz, This Company Embeds Microchips in Its Employees, and They Love It, MIT 
TECH. REV. (Aug. 17, 2018), http://www.technologyreview.com/s/611884/this-company-embeds-
microchips-in-its-employees-and-they-love-it/.  
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Part I of this Note briefly introduces the technology behind 
microchipping. Part II examines the Transhumanistic Proactionary 
Principle as a guiding philosophy in questioning whether employee 
microchipping warrants protectionary laws. Part III focuses on existing 
laws in the U.S. and in the European Union (“E.U.”) currently affecting 
implementation of RFID microchipping for employers. Part IV examines 
the associated risks and benefits of a workplace microchipping scheme in 
light of privacy concerns. Finally, Part V examines microchipping 
technology from an overall transhumanist perspective.  
I.  RFID MICROCHIPPING 
In July 2017, Wisconsin-based company Three Square Market 
announced that it would offer its employees subdermal microchipping at a 
cost to the company of approximately $300 per chip, which would be 
inserted between each employee’s index finger and thumb.2 The 
employees were told which types of information the chip would collect 
and process and freely consented to it. The chip allowed for the following 
functions: “allow door access to enter the building, sign into their 
computer, and pay for snacks – all with a wave of [the employee’s] hand 
on a sensor.”3 Three Square Market’s CEO Todd Westby stated that the 
current chip does not have any GPS functionality nor, given the limitations 
of the passive nature of the current implants, is such a function likely.4  
Currently, there is a patchwork of state laws that prohibit companies 
from requiring that their employees accept a microchip implant.5 Some 
states have common law that bans such microchipping, such as New 
York’s allowance of an automated identification procedure insofar as it 
does not involve “lasers or microchips.”6 Where no such law exists, there 
exists a question of whether a company could require an invasive 
procedure. In addition, there exists a moral panic about microchipping 
people, with easily-refuted rumors that the Affordable Care Act would 
require them to become chipped (a rumor that a satirical article spawned),7 
                                                      
2.   Trent Gillies, Why Most of Three Square Market's Employees Jumped at the Chance to Wear 
a Microchip, CNBC NEWS (Aug. 13, 2017), https://www.cnbc.com/2017/08/11/three-square-market-
ceo-explains-its-employee-microchip-implant.html. 
3.   Id. 
4.   Id. 
5.    CAL. CIVIL CODE § 52.7 (West 2008); MO. REV. STAT. § 285.035.1 (2008); N.D. CENT. 
CODE, § 12.1-15-06 (2008); OKLA. STAT. tit. 63, § 63-1-1430 (2008); WIS. STAT. § 146.25 (2005); 
MD. SB 944 (2018). For notes and other regulations, see NAT’L CONF. STATE LEG., RADIO 
FREQUENCY IDENTIFICATION (RFID) PRIVACY LAWS (Nov. 11, 2018), http://www.ncsl.org/research/t
elecommunications-and-information-technology/radio-frequency-identification-rfid-privacy-
laws.aspx.   
6.   Buchanan v. Wing, 664 N.Y.S.2d 865, 866 (App. Div. 1997).  
7.   Megan Cassidy, Satirical Article Creates Stir in Wyoming Town, STAR TRIBUNE (Jul. 30, 
2013), http://trib.com/news/local/state-and-regional/satirical-article-creates-stir-in-wyoming-
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_jurisprudence/vol11/iss2/10
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as well as religious panic that such chipping appeared to be the proverbial 
“Mark of the Beast.”8 Nonetheless, the uses for these microchips are 
expansive, and such chipping can provide additional safety and security 
for the users. For example, such microchip implants have been proposed 
as a method of security for a wide variety of groups, including Olympic 
athletes, to detect drug usage.9 Currently, football players in the National 
Football League have microchips that are being fitted into their 
uniforms.10 These chips, however, are not invasive in the same sense as 
those seen at Three Square Market or the hypothetical chips considered in 
this Note, because not only are they embedded in the clothing, but also the 
televised nature of the sport imputes a lessened expectation of privacy in 
the players’ movements and tracked information. Because of this growing 
popularity for this form of data gathering, the law must determine the 
validity of these devices in the context of a workplace setting.  
A preliminary explanation of RFID microchipping is required here 
given the novelty of the process. An RFID transponder is an electronic 
device that contains information and relies on electromagnetic fields to 
pass this information along to sensors. RFID is not a new technology; 
rather, it was used in World War II to identify friendly aircrafts.11 RFID 
chips require three core components: a chip, an antenna, and a reader.12 
RFID chips can be broken down into two different classifications based on 
the mode of data transfer. Active RFID chips have a built-in power source 
that allows them to transmit data across longer ranges. Passive chips (and 
consequently, a sub-branch called semi-passive) rely on a method of 
modulated backscatter to transmit their stored information, effectively 
utilizing power from the reading device.13 The microchipping in this Note 
primarily refers to the passive method, relying on reader devices to supply 
the bulk of the power in the operation, although active chips are addressed 
later in this Note for the purposes of looking to the future of such 
                                                                                                                           
town/article_bf915e38-98ab-51d5-85f3-9d3825617d60.html. 
8.   Jim Edwards, Microchip Implant Controversy: A Mark of the Beast or the Coming 
“Singularity”?, CNBC NEWS (Nov. 9, 2010, 3:54 PM), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/microchip-
implant-controversy-a-mark-of-the-beast-or-the-coming-singularity/. 
9.    Martha Kelner, Call for Athletes to be Fitted with Microchips in Fight Against Drug Cheats, 
THE GUARDIAN, (Oct. 10, 2017 5:00 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/sport/2017/oct/10/call-for-
athletes-to-be-fitted-with-microchips-fight-against-drug-cheats.  
10.   Ken Belson, N.F.L. Expands Use of Chips in Footballs, Promising Data Trove, N.Y. TIMES, 
(Sept. 9, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/09/07/sports/nfl-expands-use-of-chips-in-footballs-
promising-data-trove.html?_r=0. 
11.     FED. TRADE COMM’N, RADIO FREQUENCY IDENTIFICATION: APPLICATION AND 
IMPLICATION FOR CONSUMERS 6 (2005), https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/reports/rfid
-radio-frequency-identification-applications-and-implications-consumers-workshop-report-
staff/050308rfidrpt.pdf. 
12.   See id. at 3. 
13.   See id. at 6. 
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technology. Passive tags rely on a “reader talks first” (“RTF”) protocol to 
send their signal.14 Thus, these tags are not actively looking for readers; 
instead, they wait to receive a signal from a reader before sharing the 
unique identifier number with the reader. In the context of an employer, 
the reader can store and transmit the identifier number to the data 
processor where its use is at the discretion of the employer.  
 
II. TRANSHUMANISM AND THE PROACTIONARY PRINCIPLE 
 
Transhumanism is simultaneously a modern movement and a 
philosophy that seeks to improve the human condition through reliance on 
technology and innovations. Transhumanism does not blindly applaud 
emerging technologies; instead, it focuses on critically analyzing and 
weighing the risks and benefits of any given advancement. In this vein, 
British philosopher and futurist Max More developed a principle that was 
designed to encourage and advance technological progression and to 
perform analysis of the risks and benefits upon the inception of the 
technology, rather than before its use. More calls this the “Proactionary 
Principle”15 as a direct response to a more precautionary method of 
adopting and creating new technologies. The Proactionary Principle is 
broken down into seven factors: 
1. People’s freedom to innovate technologically is valuable to 
humanity. The burden of proof therefore belongs to those who 
propose restrictive measures. All proposed measures should be 
closely scrutinized. 
2. Evaluate risk according to available science, not popular 
perception, and allow for common reasoning biases. 
3. Give precedence to ameliorating known and proven threats to 
human health and environmental quality over acting against 
hypothetical risks. 
4. Treat technological risks on the same basis as natural risks; avoid 
underweighting natural risks and overweighting human-
technological risks. Fully account for the benefits of technological 
advances. 
5. Estimate the lost opportunities of abandoning a technology, and 
take into account the costs and risks of substituting other credible 
                                                      
14.   Grishma Khadka & Suk-Seung Hwang, Tag-to-Tag Interference Suppression Technique 
Based on Time Division for RFID, 17 SENSORS 78 (2017), https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/
PMC5298651/. 
15.    Max More, The Proactionary Principle, THE EXTROPY INSTITUTE (2005), 
http://www.extropy.org/proactionaryprinciple.htm. 
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options, carefully considering widely distributed effects and follow-
on effects. 
6. Consider restrictive measures only if the potential impact of an 
activity has both significant probability and severity. In such cases, 
if the activity also generates benefits, discount the impacts 
according to the feasibility of adapting to the adverse effects. If 
measures to limit technological advance do appear justified, ensure 
that the extent of those measures is proportionate to the extent of the 
probable effects. 
7. When choosing among measures to restrict technological 
innovation, prioritize decision criteria as follows: Give priority to 
risks to human and other intelligent life over risks to other species; 
give non-lethal threats to human health priority over threats limited 
to the environment (within reasonable limits); give priority to 
immediate threats over distant threats; prefer the measure with the 
highest expectation value by giving priority to more certain over 
less certain threats, and to irreversible or persistent impacts over 
transient impacts.16 
This Note relies on the Proactionary Principle in determining the 
proper level of restrictiveness, if any, that should be applied to laws 
restricting both mandatory and voluntary microchipping at a federal and 
state level. In order to do so, this Note forays into relevant employee 
privacy laws and countervailing corporate interests. 
Transhumanism is fundamentally rooted in Enlightenment 
humanism.17 It exists as a life philosophy and as an intellectual movement. 
Its ultimate goal is technological progression to transcend human 
weaknesses—a state dubbed “post-human.”18 Transhumanism recognizes 
the modern trend of storing memories externally, relying on technology to 
record and create avatars. This extension of the mind fuzzes the 
boundaries between what the human mind consists of. Transhumanism, 
however, does not leap forward blindly, promoting the use of all 
technological improvements to man. While principles such as the 
Proactionary Principle strive to generally err on the side of progress, 
Transhumanism as a philosophy shies away from technologies that do not 
exist to further the pursuit of the post-human condition. Whether or not 
RFID microchipping would suffice in the question of transhumanist 
                                                      
16.  Id. 
17.  Max More, The Philosophy of Transhumanism, in THE TRANSHUMANIST READER: 
CLASSICAL AND CONTEMPORARY ESSAYS ON THE SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY, AND PHILOSOPHY OF THE 
HUMAN FUTURE 4 (Max More & Natasha Vita-More eds., 2013). 
18.  Id. 
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progress is the fundamental question that belies the inquiry of this Note. 
Admittedly, the Proactionary Principle is usually applied to technologies 
that directly implicate the human condition and seek to improve upon 
deficiencies in the human form. Nonetheless, this Note posits that 
workplace improvements can be directly correlated to human 
improvements. As further discussed below, where a company is capable of 
operating at a higher level of efficiency, ignoring any potential negative 
ramifications on the morale or mind of the employee, society as a whole 
stands to benefit. Ultimately, an improved efficiency will lend itself to 
increased production and innovation. This increase, in turn, is the precise 
type of progress transhumanist philosophers like More envisioned.19  
Thus, to determine the worthiness of the technology, it is paramount to 
examine it under the auspice of each of the tenets of the Proactionary 
Principle. The first point weighs the burden in favor of the demand to halt 
progress. Here, regardless of how microchipping fares on the remainder of 
the tenets, it holds a strong advantage: where such progress exists, the 
technology should be assumed to be valuable as an innovation. The second 
tenet requires analysis of the new technology to focus on the basis of the 
actual, scientific risk and not popular perception. These risks are further 
expounded upon in Part IV below; however, the scientific risks, allowing 
for common reasoning biases, impute a concern about the stress and 
mental hardships that less-intrusive monitoring technologies can cause and 
thus weigh against microchipping. 
The third tenet seeks to give precedence to proven threats to human 
health. Studies seeking to understand the effect of surveillance in the 
workplace have been plentiful and the results often align: monitoring 
employees can produce beneficial effects for the workplace when the 
employees are aware of the monitoring system. A recent study on 
implementing an anti-theft monitoring system in restaurant place of 
service terminals showed a significant reduction–though not a complete 
removal–of revenue theft from the till.20 Beyond just reducing the amount 
of theft, the monitoring system seemingly pushed employees who might 
have engaged in revenue theft to redirect their efforts towards more 
productively upselling customers to increase their own financial state.21 
Other studies confirm the conclusion that monitoring employees can result 
in a more efficient workforce.22 However, such monitoring can lead to an 
                                                      
19.  Id. (“When transhumanists refer to “technology” as the primary means of effecting changes 
to the human condition, this should be understood broadly to include the design of organizations, 
economies, polities, and the use of psychological methods and tools.”).  
20.  Lamar Pierce et al., Cleaning House: The Impact of Information Technology Monitoring on 
Employee Theft and Productivity 16 (2013), https://olin.wustl.edu/docs/Faculty/Pierce_Cleaning_Hous
e.pdf. 
21.  Id. at 4. 
22. See, e.g., Melissa Bateson et al., Cues of Being Watched Enhance Cooperation in a Real-
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_jurisprudence/vol11/iss2/10
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increase in stressors that can subsequently decrease workforce morale and 
efficiency.23 Even the Supreme Court of the United States has found that 
the use of newer technologies can increase employee anxiety.24 There is, 
additionally, uncontroverted evidence that stress, especially in the 
workplace, can have a damaging effect on people, be it mental or even 
physical harm.25 There have not been sufficient studies on the effects of 
RFID microchipping on the mental or physical health of the employees 
affected, given the novelty of the process. Nonetheless, a parallel might be 
drawn between alternate forms of monitoring, such as those in the above 
studies, which might significantly hamper the mental wellness of the 
workforce, depending on their exposure to the monitoring, their 
involvement, and the level of discipline being exercised in the office. 
Thus, a balance must be found: a workplace environment where the 
employees are monitored, but not to the extent where they might feel 
discomforted by the amount of surveillance. Ultimately, this factor weighs 
heavily in favor of prohibiting mandatory implantation. Given the nature 
of a true voluntary scheme of usage, such a system of monitoring would 
prove largely ineffectual in order to discipline employees, given that not 
all employees would likely opt in. However, where mandatory, the 
stressors involved in the process of maintaining an omnipresent RFID 
microchip should logically be greater than those attached to a smart badge, 
where the remedy of simply removing it can provide at least emotional 
and mental comfort.  
Fourth, the transhumanist principles ask those proposing restriction of 
new technologies to treat technological risks on the same basis as natural 
risks. This tenet, also referred to as “symmetrical treatment,” serves the 
purpose of ridding the discussion of an anti-technological bias. The natural 
risks have been outlined in the remainder of this Note. While there is no 
cognizable risk from the insertion process, the natural risk stems from 
potential stressors or related mental burdens the tracking causes. This is 
purely hypothetical and beyond the scope of this Note. The technological 
risks, on the other hand, include the susceptibility of the data to theft, the 
permanence of the implant, and the potential advancement in chip 
technology or through the creation of a broad network of RFID receivers 
                                                                                                                           
world Setting, BIOL. LETT. 412–14 (Sept. 22, 2006), 
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC1686213/. (2006). 
23.  Mahmoud Mousa, Monitoring Employee Behavior Through the Use of Technology and 
Issues of Employee Privacy in America, SAGE OPEN 2 (2015), http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/pdf/10.
1177/2158244015580168; see also Smith et al., Employee Stress and Health Complaints in Jobs with 
and Without Electronic Performance Monitoring, 23 APPL. ERGON 17–27 (1992). 
24.   NLRB v. J. Weingarten, Inc., 420 U.S. 251, n.10 (1975). 
25.  Robert M. Sapolsky, Why Stress Is Bad for Your Brain, 273 SCIENCE 749 (1996).  
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that would allow employers to gather significantly more information than 
merely entrance into the building and access to the computer and 
lunchroom. As a result, it is imperative to treat the potential increase in 
stressors similar to the potential increase in the scope of tracking. So, this 
factor does not weigh in favor of increasing regulation or not; rather, it 
merely informs the remainder of the discussion by providing clear 
guidelines as to what must be considered when deciding how to legislate, 
or whether to legislate at all, concerning RFID microchipping.  
Transhumanism requires consideration of the lost opportunities that 
would arise should the technology be abandoned or disallowed. Here, such 
abandonment would result in a trove of data not being collected—data that 
exceeds what a company or data scientist might reveal from a data set 
derived from smart badges. This portion of the principle demands 
pontification of what might be were there no legislation banning 
mandatory implants. Indeed, given a guarantee that all employees could be 
required to bear these chips, companies could heavily invest in data 
scientists to increase productivity and create data sets to improve on work 
conditions generally.  
While such a loss would be detrimental to the future of the workplace, 
it is not without replacement. Modern smart badge usage obviates the 
necessity for an implanted tracking mechanism by providing similar data 
points. Additionally, an interested corporation could simply mandate 
usage of a smart badge that would unlock doors, pay for food, access 
computers and be able to collect and process all the same data points. 
Thus, the question must be posed: What advancement does the RFID 
microchip truly pose? Fundamentally, the mechanism is the same as a 
smart badge, albeit an employee cannot inadvertently leave his or her 
implanted microchip in a car, at home, or misplace it. The core difference, 
therefore, must be broken down into two pieces: 1) that an implanted 
microchip is inherently more convenient and impossible to misplace, 
thereby lowering potential safety risks; and 2) that an implanted microchip 
can increase functionality via an increased amount of data collection that a 
company could not achieve via strictly active scans of a smart badge. It is 
not farfetched to assume increased functionality might include higher 
degrees of tracking, even without a shift in technology. A company could, 
for example, monitor employees’ drinking habits by paying local pubs to 
install scanners on their door. This information, linked with the following 
day’s productivity, could provide a higher degree of insight into how 
employee habits affect companies’ bottom lines.  
Fundamentally, a smart badge allows the user to effectively “opt out” 
of such tracking by removing his or her badge prior to going out or when 
he or she does not want to be tracked (e.g. when he or she goes to the 
restroom). This functionality is missing in the implanted chips, barring 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_jurisprudence/vol11/iss2/10
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some advancement in consumer-level RFID blocking, which potentially 
increases the aforementioned monitoring stressors. When such broad 
tracking is available, the implanted microchips more closely resemble 
company-issued device privacy issues. An apt comparison is that of 
Robbins v. Lower Merion School District in which a school provided high 
school students with laptops and then, without permission, remotely 
activated the installed webcams.26 Although the civil case eventually 
settled, the FBI’s inquiry into the incident found that no violation of the 
law had occurred.27 When a school can track and monitor underage 
students after hours through laptops without criminal prosecution, a 
company doing so might fare no worse with their adult employees. While 
such an act might bring about common law invasion of privacy cases, this 
remains an open question that the courts have yet to decide.28 As it stands, 
though, this type of tortious claim is essentially the only recourse that 
employees have against overly broad monitoring program as there exist 
few, if any, federal legislative schemes that can protect employees from 
pervasive but expected workplace surveillance. 
Next, the Proactionary Principle requires consideration of restrictive 
measures, such as the statute this Note proposes, only if the potential 
impact of an activity has both significant probability and severity. Such a 
statute should be proportional to the extent of the probable effects. Here, 
rather than examining the hypothetical future of the technology, the 
Proactionary Principle demands examination of only the likely effects, 
which include increased productivity at the potential cost of employee 
wellbeing or morale. This portion of the principle ignores highly 
speculative results, such as a widened network of RFID receptors, always-
on tracking, or other equally invasive methods of tracking. Thus, the 
ultimate question is whether the results of an anti-mandatory chipping 
statute would be proportional to the potential risk of the probable results 
and not the speculative risks.  
Because the likely result generates efficient benefits, the consideration 
next turns toward adaptation to the adverse effects of the stressors. In 
efforts to address elevated stress, corporations should develop protocols 
and systems to maintain workplace stability. Potential solutions to the 
increased stressors are better management styles designed to ensure 
                                                      
26.  Robbins v. Lower Merion Sch. Dist., No. 10-665, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 89524, at *1 
(E.D. Pa. Aug. 30, 2010). 
         27.  See Press Release, Philadelphia Division, FBI, No Criminal Charges Filed Following 
Lower Marion School District Student Computer Monitoring Investigation (Aug. 17, 2010), 
https://archives.fbi.gov/archives/philadelphia/press-releases/2010/ph081710.htm. 
28.  Lewis Maltby, Employment Privacy: Is There Anything Left?, 39 HUMAN RIGHTS 
MAGAZINE (May 02, 2013), https://www.americanbar.org/publications/human_rights_magazine_home 
/2013_vol_39/may_2013_n2_privacy/employment_privacy.html. 
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employee mental wellbeing while still optimizing workflow. Nonetheless, 
given the lack of studies performed to determine the amount of stress that 
implanted tracking causes compared to external tracking, it is difficult to 
determine the practicality or extent required for such offsetting to occur. 
Given the lack of certainty that a system devoid of anti-mandatory 
chipping regulations could exist except at the detriment of employees, the 
measures of such a regulation must be proportionate to the potential 
negative effects. For example, banning all RFID microchipping clearly 
denies the technology room to grow and is too heavy-handed in 
comparison to the risk of increased workplace stressors. Banning 
mandatory RFID microchipping ultimately settles a better balance, but it 
can still deny corporations the power to greatly improve their workplace 
efficiency. Increased workplace efficiency should theoretically benefit 
society as a whole, because products and services could be offered with a 
tighter margin and less waste. Thus, an inquiry of the balance between the 
stressors and increased efficiency is required as an economic concern.  
Such an inquiry factors into the last portion of the principle, which 
seeks to maximize expectation values while minimizing harm, 
predominantly against humans. This Note does not presuppose such an 
inquiry to be viable without significantly more data than currently exists. 
Thus, the standing principle should be to proceed with caution: the law 
should allow the technology, but should also provide safeguards for 
individuals who do not wish to partake in the experiment—a mentality that 
resembles this Note’s proposed anti-mandatory RFID microchipping 
legislation.  
In light of the above factors, it is clear that microchipping should be 
handled with caution. Though it is crucial to let technology breathe and 
determine its merit in a practicable environment, society must factor in the 
risks that it faces should such microchipping be mandatory for employees. 
Thus, a proper statutory scheme ought to protect an employer’s right to 
run such a program and an employee’s right to voluntarily consent to 
microchipping, while being cautious of the potential harm that such 
surveillance might cause. This Note now examines such statutory 
provisions, considering this balance in light of how the states or even the 
federal government should apply the Proactionary Principle.  
 
III. EXISTING LAW IN THE UNITED STATES AND IN THE EUROPEAN UNION 
 
The current state of the law prohibiting mandatory microchipping the 
U.S. is a patchwork. Some states have enacted laws preventing employers 
from requiring that their employees be microchipped. Even so, these states 
have a limited set of protections available for employees who are 
pressured into voluntarily accepting the microchipping or those who refuse 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_jurisprudence/vol11/iss2/10
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microchipping under a voluntary scheme. Under the General Data 
Protection Regulation (“GDPR”), passed in the E.U. in April of 2016, such 
employees receive a series of fundamental protections against schemes of 
pseudo-voluntary microchipping.29 European law should inform American 
legal developments on protections from employer overreach, such as 
potentially terminating an at-will employee as a result of—although not 
expressly because of—his or her refusal to consent to a company 
microchipping scheme.  
The California statute that prevents mandatory microchipping 
provides that “a person shall not require, coerce, or compel any other 
individual to undergo the subcutaneous implanting of an identification 
device.”30 Specifically, the statute goes on to define the phrase “require, 
coerce, or compel” to include “physical violence, threat, intimidation, 
retaliation, the conditioning of any private or public benefit or care on 
consent to implantation, including employment, promotion, or other 
employment benefit, or by any means that causes a reasonable person of 
ordinary susceptibilities to acquiesce to implantation when he or she 
otherwise would not.”31 This definition provides strong protections for at-
will employees who might be concerned that their ability to move up in a 
company is premised upon their willingness to accept the microchip. 
Nonetheless, this functions like many other issues that at-will employees 
suffer: proving the causation behind their termination or why they did not 
receive a promotion is difficult and often leaves the power in the hands of 
the employer to terminate the at-will employee at the employer’s 
discretion.32 Despite this weakness, the California statute remains the 
strongest protection amongst the current state statutes that prevent 
mandatory microchipping.  
Missouri’s statute simply prevents “requir[ing] an employee to have 
personal identification microchip technology implanted into an employee 
for any reason” with no additional protections against coercive pseudo-
voluntary implanting schemes.33 Nor do North Dakota’s, Oklahoma’s, or 
Wisconsin’s statutes have such a protection. Most recently, Maryland 
                                                      
 29.  Regulation 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on 
the Protection of Natural Persons with Regard to the Processing of Personal Data and on the Free 
Movement of Such Data, and Repealing Directive 95/46/EC (General Data Protection Regulation), 
2016 O.J. (L 119) 1 [hereinafter “GDPR”], (Article 43 finding that an imbalance between the data 
subject and the controller can affect the consent). 
30.  CAL. CIV. CODE § 52.7(a). 
31.  Cal. Civ. Code § 52.7(h)(4). 
32.  Clyde W. Summers, Employment at Will in the United States: The Divine Right of 
Employers, 3 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 65, 77 (2000) (“The dominant judicial perspective is that 
employers should have unfettered freedom to determine who should be employed and that workers are 
subordinate to the employer's decisions-however arbitrary they may be.”).  
33.  MO. REV. STAT. § 285.035.1 (2008). 
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passed SB 944, which took effect on October 1, 2018. Maryland 
prohibited “requiring, coercing, or compelling an individual”, defining that 
as, “including the use of physical violence, threat, intimidation, retaliation, 
the conditioning of any private or public benefit, including employment, 
promotion, or other employment benefit, and any other means to cause a 
reasonable individual of ordinary susceptibilities to acquiesce when the 
individual otherwise would not.”34 This mirrors the California statute and, 
consequently, provides a similarly high level of protection.  
Outside of California and Maryland, an employer can create a 
“voluntary” microchipping scheme and coerce employees into allowing 
the implant to maintain good standing in the company and be available for 
promotions. The California statutes echoes the policies behind Title VII of 
the Civil Rights Act of 1964 of an “actionable employer action” in its 
prevention of discriminatory retaliation. The California and Maryland 
statutes should be held as the baseline level of protection provided to 
American employees who face risks of retaliation by employers for not 
volunteering to be microchipped.  
Where American workplaces view issues of employee consent 
liberally, European workplaces provide more fundamental protections for 
employees. Such protections become clearly evinced in the recently 
enacted GDPR in the E.U. The GDPR focuses on providing protections for 
European citizens’ data from global and domestic processing, thereby 
including the processing that would occur through a process like 
microchipping. The GDPR provides that “consent should not be regarded 
as freely given if the data subject has no genuine or free choice or is 
unable to refuse or withdraw consent without detriment.”35 This provision 
provides a hefty roadblock to employers seeking to merely garner consent 
by pressuring employees to agree to their terms. American employers are 
free to effectively force consent by threatening to fire the employee for 
failure to comply.36 Employers still maintain the bulk of the power in the 
relationship by being able to fire at-will employees for “any reason or no 
reason.”37 Thus, even under the protections of California and Maryland’s 
anti-mandatory chipping statute, Cal. Civ. Code § 52.7, an employer can 
simply terminate the employee for no reason or any other reason where 
such an employee refused microchipping. 
The difficulties here are symptoms of wider employment law issues 
and are not specific to RFID microchipping. However, if enforcement 
lacks the needed teeth, even the best statutes prove ineffectual. This 
                                                      
34.  Md. General Assemb. S.B. 944, Reg. Sess. (Feb. 5, 2018). 
35.  GDPR, art. 42. 
36.  See, e.g., Jennings v. Minco Tech. Labs, Inc., 765 S.W.2d 497, 502 (Tex. App. 1989) 
(where a court upheld an employer’s voluntary drug test or get fired rule).  
37.  Geary v. U.S. Steel Corp., 319 A.2d 174 (1974). 
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creates a fundamental difficulty in the laws surrounding RFID 
microchipping: while California and Maryland arguably have the most 
comprehensive anti-mandatory or pressured microchipping laws currently 
in place, an employee cannot be refused promotion for failing to obtain a 
microchip. Few courts, if any, will be capable of finding that such a 
promotion was denied for failure to comply with the microchipping 
protocol.38 It is easy to conjure reasons for termination where someone has 
failed to volunteer for microchipping: not a team worker, inefficient, not 
forward thinking, or simply no reason provided. Given that at-will 
employment is a foreign concept to European workers, the protections for 
European workers prove significantly more fruitful.39 French law, for 
example, provides a complex labyrinth of protections for employees that 
heavily restrict, or at least delay, employers’ abilities to terminate them.40 
Because of this complexity, it becomes difficult to terminate an employee 
merely for his or her unwillingness to volunteer for microchipping. 
However, there is no legal protection that can cause an employer not to 
frown upon or dislike an employee for his or her failure to comply. Thus, 
even under the most protectionist legal agenda, employers can pressure 
employees to accept the microchipping.  
The GDPR is not inherently a protective regulation in regards to 
employment, although some of its terms apply and protect employees in 
the context of their workplace. The GDPR only is in effect where there is 
data being processed and that data is personal information (often referred 
to as “personally identifiable information,” or “PII”) of a person in the 
E.U. The GDPR seemingly prohibits companies from mandatorily 
implanting RFID chips, unless there is a legitimate reason that would 
balance against the countervailing employee interest of maintaining the 
employee’s own agency. Given the fact that the GDPR has not come into 
effect, there exists no substantive case law, leaving a lingering question as 
to what might constitute a “legitimate interest.”  
  
                                                      
38.  Only insofar as the employer does not specifically write or say that the failure to comply 
with the microchipping was the reason for the employee’s termination.  
39.    The Littler Report, LITTLER MENDELSON 14 (Feb. 2013), https://www.littler.com/files/pres
s/pdf/WP-2012-Global-Employer-3-25-13.pdf. 
40.  Craig S. Smith, Letter from Paris: 4 Simple Rules for Firing an Employee in France (Mar. 
28, 2006), http://www.nytimes.com/2006/03/28/world/europe/letter-from-paris-4-simple-rules-for-
firing-an-employee-in.html. 
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Nonetheless, given the examples of legitimate interests laid out in the 
GDPR,41 it seems unlikely that improvements to efficiency would 
constitute such a legitimate interest. Even if there were found to be a 
legitimate interest in increasing the efficiency of the company, the baseline 
level of monitoring that RFID microchipping enables would still push the 
balancing test to the side of unacceptability.  
Another concept that the GDPR explores that has not been 
successfully addressed in U.S. law is the concept of consent. While Recital 
155 of the GDPR42 ostensibly leaves it up to the E.U. member states to 
determine what constitutes valid employee consent, the GDPR generally 
looks cynically at consent, unless such consent is freely given.43 In other 
words, there would be no consequences when an employee declines 
microchip implantation. This bars false consent, namely that if one does 
not consent, he or she can find other employment. As a result, mandatory 
chipping is completely outlawed in the E.U. Even consented-to 
microchipping requires a heightened level of security over the data 
captured.  
Employers seeking additional information about the behaviors of their 
employees is nothing new. Whether it was Pinkerton agents following 
someone around in the nineteenth-century44 to contemporary monitoring 
technology, there is value in measuring and examining employee behavior. 
Monitoring can promote workplace effectiveness, efficiency, and 
timeliness. An employee found to be coming in early and staying too late 
can be met with if his or her productivity does not reflect his or her hours, 
encouraging a more productive, shorter work period. Worksite wellness 
programs have already been used to encourage employees to reduce 
addictions, such as smoking.45 A company can use the RFID microchips to 
                                                      
41.  GDPR Article 47 contains the examples of direct marketing and fraud prevention. Article 
48 contains the example of personal data with a group of undertakings for the purpose of 
administrative oversight. Article 49 contains the example of network and information security. Article 
50 contains the example of reporting possible criminal actions. 
42.   GDPR Article 155 allows member states to provide “specific rules on the processing of 
employees' personal data in the employment context, in particular for the conditions under which 
personal data in the employment context may be processed on the basis of the consent of the 
employee, the purposes of the recruitment, the performance of the contract of employment, including 
discharge of obligations laid down by law or by collective agreements, management, planning and 
organisation of work, equality and diversity in the workplace, health and safety at work, and for the 
purposes of the exercise and enjoyment, on an individual or collective basis, of rights and benefits 
related to employment, and for the purpose of the termination of the employment relationship.” 
43.  Specifically, Article 43 of the GDPR questions whether consent exists where “there is a 
clear imbalance between the data subject and the controller.” 
44.  RHODRI JEFFREYS-JONES, CLOAK AND DOLLAR: A HISTORY OF AMERICAN SECRET 
INTELLIGENCE (2003).  
45.  See, e.g., Heirich M, Sieck C.J., Worksite Cardiovascular Wellness Programs as a Route 
To Substance Abuse Prevention, 42 J. OCCUP. ENVIR. MED. 47–56 (2000); D.B. Gold, et al., Impact of 
a Telephone-Based Intervention on the Reduction of Health Risks, 15 AM. J. HEALTH PROMOT. 97–106 
(2000).  
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track smoking breaks by keying access to the smoking area and checking 
entrance and exit times from the area. Then, by attaching incentives, the 
company can encourage and track reduction of time spent in the area 
without manually tracking usage. Unlike with smart badges, an employee 
cannot simply remove his or her badge before exiting, as RFID receivers 
would detect his or her entrance and exit from the area. This advantage 
means it is difficult, albeit not impossible, to circumvent measures the 
corporation puts into effect, whether they are meant to improve employee 
welfare or increase workplace efficiency. Thus, the costs to the employer 
remain limited, while providing a trove of data to comb through with the 
hopes of finding something to increase productivity. 
For the employee, however, the costs become far steeper. Ellen Bayer 
of the American Management Association noted that “privacy in today’s 
workplace is largely illusory.”46 Indeed, there are few laws protecting an 
employee’s privacy from excess surveillance in the workplace,47 especially 
when compared to the overarching protections in the E.U. Because, for 
example, the employer often owns an employee’s machine, that employer 
can search the employee’s computer. As “bring-your-own-device” policies 
come into vogue, employers can gain easy access to information normally 
outside the boundaries of the job, such as photos, texts, personal e-mails, 
and notes.  
While the amount of information RFID microchipping currently 
gathers is miniscule in comparison to the other data that can be collected, 
the issue is not the types of information being collected per se, but the ease 
by which that data is processed. The Supreme Court of the United States 
has found the scalability of surveillance to provoke altered legal reactions 
from their original form, where a more easily applied system of 
surveillance is more likely to interfere with individuals’ rights than a 
method requiring more manual input.48  A police officer following a single 
car from one location to another is acceptable. However, society does not 
allow the police to remotely track, twenty-four hours a day, seven days a 
week, an entire city’s worth of cars.49 The reasoning as described in 
Justice Sotomayor’s concurrence in United States v. Jones is clear: when 
the cost of surveillance is the man-hours of a police department with 
limited resources, surveillance will only be done when needed.50  
  
                                                      
46.    The Rise of Workplace Spying, THE WEEK (July 5, 2015), http://theweek.com/articles/5642
63/rise-workplace-spying. 
47.  See, e.g., Ifeoma Ajunwa, Limitless Worker Surveillance, 105 CAL. L. REV. 735 (2017). 
48.  United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 416 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (finding that 
the low cost of GPS monitoring alters the relationship between the citizen and the government). 
49.  Id. 
50.  Id.  
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When the cost of surveillance instead is merely using an automated 
service, surveillance will be done limitlessly. Microchipping an employee 
fulfills the latter. Take, for example, a standard company that employs 200 
employees. Each day, employees swipe in for the morning, buy lunch in 
the café, then swipe out for the day. In this excessively simplified example 
with no bathroom breaks, break room visits, or any other non-work 
activities, the employer would collect 180,000 data points over the course 
of a year of work.51  
As more employees are chipped, the number of data points increases. 
The more data points an employer collects, the more capable they will be 
of quickly detecting trends. Adding in each instance where the employee 
unlocks his or her computer (which would happen only twice a day in the 
example above)52, an employer would have collected approximately 
300,000 data points over the same time period. More complete data means 
an employer can paint a clearer picture about how much time an employee 
spends on specific tasks and activities and determine their level of 
productivity without requiring direct managerial oversight. This, in turn, 
can be used to implement company policies to restrict activities or tasks 
that consume more time than generate revenue, which could be a positive 
result if we ignore the human ramifications. 
Many American corporations can already track an employee’s time 
using timecards, computer monitoring, and keycards. Thus, in defending 
the microchip, the question must be posed: what makes the RFID 
microchip any more invasive than the already-in-place means of 
surveilling employees? Aside from the procedure of implanting the chip, 
the answer at this point in time appears to be purely the convenience of the 
corporation. Instead of pairing the data from the keycard to the data from 
the computer to the data from the cafeteria about the employee’s meal, a 
microchip allows a singular source of information to compile all three. A 
company can use this data to increase efficiency and measure trends to 
make changes to its systems. There may be a specific food in the cafeteria 
causing a post-lunch slowdown, and a microchip-activated coffee machine 
could be used to determine the optimal caffeine intake for employees.  
A diligent manager can determine this by relying on standard office 
surveillance, but would lack the capacity to create and manage such an 
exhaustive data set independently. Moreover, were this information 
gathered and compiled manually, its cost would likely outweigh its 
benefits. Such a use of the microchip might feel excessive but would likely 
be acceptable. If the data being processed were sufficiently anonymized 
                                                      
51.  Assuming, for the sake of this calculation, an estimated 300-day work year.  
52.  Ignoring breaks or other reasons to step away, an employee might unlock their terminal 
upon arrival, lock for lunch, unlock upon returning from lunch, and finally lock once again at the end 
of the day.  
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and used in a manner consistent with such anonymization (specifically, 
used in such a way where the employer neither would nor could pair the 
data to a specific employee), there would be no privacy issue under even 
the more intensive scrutiny of the GDPR.  
However, as the uses and abilities of the microchips continue to grow, 
so too do the implications for their ability to process data and provide 
information to employers. Microchips also pose grave security risks to 
employers who rely on them. Devices like “BLEkey,” a cheap low energy 
signal mimicker that preys on weaknesses in the Wiegand protocol,53 can 
mimic legitimate RFID signals that such devices have silently copied.54 
Having a single point of failure exist inside one’s body, especially one 
where any patching must be done by removing the chip and installing a 
new one, poses fundamental physical security issues. Once in, a bad actor 
utilizing a false signal now has access to doors, computer, and common 
workspace areas. However, this problem is not unique to the microchip.  
Current keycards have the same problem from the door, and password 
access is bypass-able where no two-factor authentication exists. Yet, 
putting all the information on a singular device—one that a user cannot 
secure aside from wearing a glove that would block the signal—poses a 
fundamental security concern that security analysts are far better equipped 
to address. Again, this is a situation that technological solutions can 
address. A decade ago, Dr. Elaine Ramesh wrote that the procedure of 
installing RFID chips into teeth was a work in progress,55 a change that 
would ostensibly make it harder to garner someone’s passkeys from a 
simple handshake. Rather than argue that the technology is not yet ready, 
this Note argues that as the technology progresses, a legal answer is 
increasingly necessary because of the risks posed to employees who lack 
the capacity to turn down the microchipping, even if presented in a 
voluntary fashion. 
  
                                                      
53.  Francis Brown, RFIDiggity, Pentest Guide to Hacking HF/NFC and UHF RFID, BISHOP 
FOX (Apr. 5, 2016), http://www.bishopfox.com/files/slides/2016/InfoSec_World_2016-RFIDiggity-
Brown-05Apr2016.pdf. While this Note will not investigate the specifics of the well-covered 
cybersecurity risks of the Wiegand protocol, it is important and relevant to note that even new devices 
allow for backwards compatibility with Wiegand protocol compliant RFID devices—meaning many 
businesses can still fall victim to this issue.  
54.  Swati Khandelwal, This $10 Device Can Clone RFID-equipped Access Cards Easily, THE 
HACKER NEWS, (July 28, 2015), https://thehackernews.com/2015/07/hacking-rfid-access-card.html. 
Undoubtedly, a lot of security gaps on this front can be overcome with additional research and 
development but the current schema for RFID usage relies, at least in part, on security by obscurity.  
55.  Elaine Ramesh, Time Enough—Consequences of Microchip Implantation, 8 RISK: 
HEALTH, SAFETY, & ENVIR. 373–407 (1997), 
http://scholars.unh.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1344&context=risk 
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IV. RFID MICROCHIPPING IN LIGHT OF PRIVACY CONCERNS 
 
Upon collection and processing of the information obtained by RFID 
microchipping, employers will have to deal with safely maintaining the 
integrity of this data. As the Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”) noted in 
its “RFID Applications and Implications” report, experts are concerned 
about the manner in which the data is stored after it is collected.56 In the 
event of a data breach, hackers might only receive pseudonymized 
identification numbers and the access time or, ideally, a completely 
encrypted data set that is of no use to them. However, such information 
can still be personally identifiable simply by pairing up arrival time or 
days off. Access to current information (as opposed to just past 
information) would allow a bad actor to merely keep track of door entries 
and line up one or two days of data to determine which employee bore 
which identification number. As the employer collects and processes more 
data, the danger of a potential breach increases. Nonetheless, where the 
FTC brings the federal actions for privacy protection, no such action has 
been brought solely in regards to the information pertaining only to the 
employees of a company. This is a result of the purpose of the FTC’s 
consumer protection initiative, under which fair employment practices do 
not fall. Such protection would fall under the purview of the National 
Labor Relation Board (“NLRB”) whose actions indicate a willingness to 
protect private-sector employees.57 Nonetheless, because there has not 
been a breach of this technology to date (namely, because so few 
employees in America are currently microchipped), it is unclear which 
actions the NLRB will take in its efforts to protect employees, should such 
a breach occur.  
Fundamentally, the protections available for at-will employees against 
being compelled to receive a microchip in states other than California and 
Maryland are mechanically akin to those bringing Title VII claims against 
their employers. The current scheme of protection grants employers ample 
leeway in their ability to terminate an at-will employee for most reasons. 
Provided the employer does not have a policy or a clear pattern of 
terminating–in the case of Title VII–members of a protected class, it can 
be difficult for Title VII claims to succeed.58 Similar factors can therefore 
be used to discover instances of firing or failure to promote, as illustrated 
in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green.59  
                                                      
56.  FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 11.  
57.  See, e.g., NLRB’s recent order barring AT&T Mobility LLC from disallowing employees 
from filming co-workers as an example of their directive.  
58.  See, e.g., Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 570 U.S. 338, 360 (2013) (requiring proof 
that the prohibited criterion was the but-for cause of the termination). 
59.  McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). 
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The existing privacy laws do little to protect employees from 
overreaching privacy interferences from employers. One of the most 
rudimentary issues here is consent. Consent in the U.S. is often viewed at 
a more “macro” level, as compared to European privacy laws. Where 
European laws allow more user level controls and require an opt-in 
process for more traditionally invasive behaviors, American law is almost 
entirely the inverse. The macro level view can be summarized as such: 
either consent or choose not to work here. Assuming, therefore, that an 
employee chose to continue to work somewhere, receiving the microchip 
instead of losing his or her job, this might manifest consent. Once the user 
has consented, the data collection can be used for the purposes outlined 
upfront. Failure to uphold this portion of the arrangement is more akin to a 
contract law violation than a privacy law violation. While the FTC has 
authority over unfair trade practices, which involve changing the scope of 
a consented-to arrangement without providing notice, this is outside of the 
FTC’s typical authority to take such an action where it is not affecting the 
public at large, but rather, “consenting” employees at a specific 
corporation.60  
Other statutory provisions designed to protect the public from overly 
aggressive privacy invasions also fail to protect employees from predatory 
pressures involved in microchipping. While the technology looks akin to 
the protections enabled by the Electronic Communications Privacy Act 
(“ECPA”), ECPA provides employers with the legal right to monitor work 
e-mail, web activity, and other electronic activity, which would include the 
electric signal received by the RFID transmitters installed around the 
office.61 
Additionally, the employers own the RFID receivers that they install 
around the office, meaning the data is theirs to collect. Accordingly, the 
data they collect via electronic means rightfully belongs to them under any 
statutory scheme that is currently available. In order to secure the privacy 
for employees who seek to limit the amount of information that their 
employers can collect and process about their workplace activity, the 
legislation must therefore address the privacy concerns prior to the 
employee passing an installed RFID receiver, or directly limit the usage of 
the data.  
Limiting the usage of the data collected by the employer through 
legislation, however, is legally problematic. In Sorrell v. IMS Health, the 
government sought to protect a specific type of data from a specific 
                                                      
60.  FED. TRADE COMM’N, A BRIEF OVERVIEW OF THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION'S 
INVESTIGATIVE AND LAW ENFORCEMENT AUTHORITY (2008), https://www.ftc.gov/about-ftc/what-we-
do/enforcement-authority. 
61.  V. John Ella, Employee Monitoring and Workplace Privacy Law, AM. BAR ASS’N (2016). 
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usage.62 Specifically, the government sought to limit pharmacists from 
selling data to pharmaceutical companies that the pharmaceutical 
companies would use for the purpose of “detailing” doctors, or using the 
data to help them encourage doctors to sell more of their products. The 
Supreme Court, in a 5-4 split, found that the law effectuated content and 
speaker-based discrimination and was therefore unconstitutional under the 
First Amendment. The limitation on the “speech” of processing employee 
data is arguably less pronounced than that of Sorrell, but the fact remains 
that such a law can be excessively burdensome on the First Amendment-
protected speech of the corporation. Where the law seeks only to prohibit 
the usage of this data for corporations, but allows it for, say, Alzheimer’s 
patients or prisoners, it inherently is selecting a valid viewpoint or speaker 
while denying another. While the State of Vermont attempted to argue that 
the law was merely commercial regulation, this was insufficient because 
the law was found to impose “more than an incidental burden on protected 
expression.”63  
Because of the constitutional dangers of restricting the means through 
which the data is used, it is clearer that protections against the actual 
mandatory chipping are superior. The federal government undoubtedly has 
the authority to issue such a regulation, which closely mirrors other federal 
labor laws.64 Given the lack of legislative force on privacy in the 
workplace, a law like this would more closely echo laws that protect 
worker rights. This conceptually removes the necessity for implementing 
stronger privacy rights for workers than already exists, but allows for a 
specifically targeted law that might relieve workers of a particular issue. 
An employer will still be able to obtain the bulk of the same information 
through smart badges, but will do so without interfering with an 
employee’s anatomical autonomy without the employee willingly 
consenting to such a technological intrusion. 
 
V. TRANSHUMANISM AND MICROCHIPPING 
 
Some transhumanists have adopted a form of utilitarianism. Of 
particular note is philosopher and co-founder of Humanity+, an 
international organization that advocates for ethical techno-utopianism, 
David Pearce, who proposed the “hedonistic imperative.”65 Seeking 
eradication of sentient suffering, Pearce proposes an ethical utilitarian 
view of expansion and progression in technology. By focusing on 
                                                      
62.  Sorrell v. IMS Health, 564 U.S. 552 (2011). 
63.  Id. at 556. 
64.  See, e.g., Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. § 201 (1938) (A law with a similar purpose 
of work protection at a federal level. 
65.  David Pearce, The Hedonistic Imperative, (1995), https://www.hedweb.com/. 
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maximizing positive value and eliminating negative value from the 
technology, Pearce argues that a purist hedonism ought to be the passage 
to an ideal future without suffering.66 This philosophy might entice 
transhumanists, but denies the necessity for progress that More so 
elegantly reflects in the Proactionary Principle. To become the post-human 
hedonistic model Pearce sought, humanity must first develop the 
technologies to displace itself from the workplace, which must become the 
primary objective. Philosophically, this must be disassociated from 
idealism that embodies the bulk of the transhumanist movement. Where 
Transhumanism already angles itself towards inevitability of 
enhancements Michael Shapiro discussed,67 it becomes entangled in its 
own ideals.  
Thus, to align the concepts of microchipping with the traditional non-
More theorists in the transhumanist school imputes a strong distaste for the 
concept. An enhancement should not forfeit a fundamental freedom to an 
employer where instead technology ought to be used in a Piercian 
hedonistic society. However, without the weary progress that fails to align 
with the ethical utilitarianism, there can be no ascension beyond “the life-
impoverishing hang-ups of humanity's biological past.”68 As More points 
out, the bulk of the transhumanist philosophers can agree that major 
scientific and technological progress is “both possible and desirable.”69 
Beyond that, More writes, the agreement ends.70 Nonetheless, there exists 
a counterpoint to transhumanism upon which the philosophers agree: the 
weariness of “bioconservatives,” namely, those who are unwilling to affect 
a technological change in themselves, regardless of its objective positive 
effect.  
Nick Bostrom, a Swedish transhumanist philosopher, sets forth four 
levels of objections to post-humanity, which is the prime objective of the 
movement.71 These objections closely mirror potential objections to 
microchipping technology. Level 0, he contends, is that “it can’t be done.” 
This can be easily dispatched in the present case: it has already been done. 
Level 1 provides a more practical response: it is too difficult or costly. 
                                                      
66.  Id. at 93.  
67. Michael Shapiro, Performance Enhancement and Legal Theory, in TRANSHUMANIST 
READER: CLASSICAL AND CONTEMPORARY ESSAYS ON THE SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY, AND 
PHILOSOPHY OF THE HUMAN FUTURE 283 (Max More & Natasha Vita-More eds., 2013). 
68.  Pearce, supra note 65. 
69.  Max More, The Philosophy of Transhumanism, in TRANSHUMANIST READER: CLASSICAL 
AND CONTEMPORARY ESSAYS ON THE SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY, AND PHILOSOPHY OF THE HUMAN 
FUTURE 14 (Max More & Natasha Vita-More eds., 2013). 
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Here, however, the cost of the chips is low for each individual employee 
and the benefit from the information provided by the chips likely 
outweighs the modest cost per chip.72 Bostrom lumps medical concerns 
into this category as well, some of which have been posited against 
microchipping although never proven.73 Level 2 is that it would be bad for 
society. This summons the Proactionary Principle—determining the 
positive effect on society as a whole. Clearly, if efficiency were to increase 
without any human cost, this would resolve the Level 2 criticism. Level 3 
criticism of post-humanity–and, in this context, the step towards it that 
might be microchipping–is the claim that lives would be worse. Thus, at 
Level 3, one can bring in the proposal that an excess increase in efficiency 
might fundamentally harm or damage the employee’s psyche or ability to 
cognitively perform at a high level, even where there exists a high level of 
efficiency. Here, one can add in the danger of such a policy giving rise to 
gamesmanship and forcing employees to actively circumvent the safety 
measures that employers put into place. Finally, Bostrom’s Level 4 is that 
“we couldn’t benefit.” This, ultimately, is the sticking point of RFID 
microchipping.  
Transhumanism as a whole can therefore be used to view the 
technology in two different ways: (1) that RFID microchipping is 
inherently a benefit to humans on the path to post-humanity, given its 
propensity for increasing market efficiencies and furthering the likelihood 
of human displacement from the market, or (2) that the minor benefits of 
convenience to the human are drastically outdone by the inconvenience, 
risks, and pressure placed upon them, thus providing a small benefit at a 
high cost. Given the idealistic nature of transhumanists like More and 
Pearce, it is not a stretch to say that they would not recognize the 
technological advancement sufficient to warrant inquiry and find that the 
costs to the human are too great to warrant such an intrusion, not 
physically but mentally. This mirrors Pearce’s ethical utilitarianism. Like 
Bentham’s Principle of Utility, the incursion into the mental space of the 
employee brings more pain than pleasure to the employee.74 Bentham’s 
means of quantification of the two involves weighing this pain (the 
pressure, stress, and so forth) with the pleasure (the convenience garnered 
from the chip). 
 Unlike Transhumanism, Bentham’s utilitarianism demands a 
quantifiable measurement for the trade-off between the pain and the 
                                                      
72.  Gillies, supra note 2. 
73.  In fact, the FDA has explicitly cleared microchip implanting for humans. See Associated 
Press, FDA Approves Computer Chip for Humans, NBC NEWS (Oct. 13, 2004), 
http://www.nbcnews.com/id/6237364/ns/health-health_care/t/fda-approves-computer-chip-humans/. 
74.  JEREMY BENTHAM, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND LEGISLATION 
(1780). 
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pleasure. To quantify the balance, one must take a similar approach, as this 
Note does, to the sixth tenet of the Proactionary Principle, that of weighing 
the probable risks with the probable benefits. However, the speculative 
effect on the economy cannot be considered as an overall wellbeing of the 
economy and cannot be strictly construed to equal the pleasure of the 
employee. In fact, various studies have indicated that an increase in the 
American economy has not been tied to an increase in the general 
American happiness.75 Thus, the only meaningful pleasure that is 
foreseeable under a Bentham-esque analysis is the satisfaction of fulfilling 
a company directive. However, such joy is diminished where the 
fulfilment of the directive is a matter of necessity.76  
Thus, under utilitarianism, the technological progress inspired by 
RFID microchip implanting might be otherwise impeded. This is, in a 
sense, what Transhumanism seeks to avoid. Because microchipping 
necessarily benefits the corporation rather than the employee, at least in 
the short term, a utilitarian philosophy dictates that the microchipping 
should not exist, as it will consistently cause more pain than pleasure for 
the microchipped individual. For this reason, Bentham’s utilitarianism 
becomes overly restrictive against the potential long-lasting benefits that 
microchipping can provide to corporations and to the U.S. economy. 
However, transhumanism does not recklessly advocate for advancements 
in technology without regard for the subsequent effects on the individuals. 
While the Proactionary Principle does, in part, limit the consideration of 
the effect of the technology to those that are reasonable, transhumanism 
considers the movement of the species towards a sense of technological 
ascension and to discover new possibilities for ordinary living.77 While 
Bentham and other philosophers might seek a more hedonistic result, 
transhumanism allows a level of “pain” on the individual level in order to 
achieve greater heights as a species.  
However, Bentham’s calculus is not entirely converse to the 
transhumanistic foresight embodied in the Proactionary Principle. 
Bentham recognized that pain and pleasure could both be measured in 
their propinquity, or how imminent the two are when performing the 
calculus.78 This does not completely square away with transhumanism 
                                                      
75.  See, e.g., Ed Diener, Beyond Money: Toward an Economy of Well-Being, 5 PSYCHOL. SCI. 
IN THE PUB. INTEREST 1–31 (2004). 
76.    It is worth considering that studies are relatively conflicted in regards to whether or not 
such joy experienced by the employee feeds back into the company as a form of productivity or profit. 
Cf., e.g., Cynthia D. Fisher, Happiness at Work, 12 INT’L J. MGMT. REVS. 384–412 (2010); Rhian 
Silvestro, Dispelling the Modern Myth: Employee Satisfaction and Loyalty Drive Service Profitability, 
22 INT’L J. OPERATIONS & PRODUCTION MGMT. 30–49 (2002).  
77.  See, Julian Huxley, Transhumanism, 6 ETHICS IN PROGRESS 12–16 (2015). 
78.  BENTHAM, supra note 74. 
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since transhumanism seeks to create long-term benefits. Only in the final 
portion of the Proactionary Principle is there such a reference to an idea 
like propinquity—that imminent threats ought to receive priority over 
distant threats. Yet, there exists only a modest analogy for the pleasure 
where the threats are akin to the pain.  
The Proactionary Principle values increased determinate pleasure 
more than increased hypothetical pleasure. This exists parallel to 
Bentham’s concept of propinquity by extrapolation that a distant pleasure 
is, by its very nature, a more hypothetical pleasure or that it is too distant 
to matter. Still, the connection between the two on this point is that of 
divergence and not of convergence. While transhumanism pays heed to the 
time that it will take for the results to come to fruition and for the risks to 
fester in the meantime, the philosophy still allows for progression at a 
cost. This, crucially, is the backbone of transhumanism. Transhumanism 
does not blindly amble towards technological progress while ignoring the 
human cost. Nor is transhumanism unwilling to exert some pain in order to 
achieve a globalized future pleasure.  
 
CONCLUSION 
 
Relying on Max More’s Proactionary Principle and Pearce’s overtly 
hedonistic Bentham-esque ethical utilitarianism, RFID microchipping 
cannot be said to be a drastic or meaningful step towards post-humanism. 
The technology’s risks outweigh the benefits and threats to the condition 
of the worker, while not actively propelling the human race further 
towards the ideal condition. Nonetheless, under the guidance of the 
Proactionary Principle, such a technological advance ought not be halted 
on the grounds of fearfulness or concerns about the results.  
Therefore, consistent with Transhumanism, this Note concludes that 
law must be reshaped to allow for willing and interested employees to take 
part in RFID microchipping campaigns, but only where they are capable 
of withdrawing from the program or unwilling employees are able to reject 
the program without adverse ramifications. Given the limits of 
employment law in relation to at-will employees, the law must provide the 
best protections that it can without overreaching. California and 
Maryland’s statutes preventing compulsion through coercive behavior 
such as denial of promotions strikes closest at providing a workable 
remedy that simultaneously allows interested employees the opportunity to 
test the technological waters, while leaving “bioconservatives,” or those 
hesitant about this specific technology, to remove themselves from the 
initiative while remaining competitive in the workforce.  
Rather than waiting on states to implement serviceable statutes that 
prevent employers from mandating microchipping or pressuring 
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employees to accept the microchipping for fear of not getting a promotion 
or bonus, the federal government should protect the advancement of the 
technology and employees’ welfare by passing legislation that mirrors that 
of California and Maryland: no mandatory microchipping and no reliance 
on workplace pressures to ensure that employees consent. Such a law does 
not impede the flow of technology; rather, it increases workers’ rights and 
legitimizes an interest in implanted privacy.  
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